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Abstract
Background: Collective health behavior often demonstrates counter-intuitive dynamics, sometimes resisting
interventions designed to produce change, or even producing effects that are in the opposite direction than
intended by the intervention, e.g. lowering infectivity resulting in increased infections. At other times collective
health behavior exhibits sudden large-scale change in response to small interventions or change in the environment, a
phenomenon often called “tipping.” I hypothesize that these seemingly very different phenomena can all be explained
by the same dynamic, a type of collective resilience.
Methods: I compared two simple agent-based models of interactions in networks: a public health behavior game, in
which individuals decide whether or not to adopt protective behavior, and a microbial-level game, in which
three different strains of bacteria attack each other. I examined the type of networks and other conditions that
support a dynamic balance, and determined what changes of conditions will tip the balance.
Results: Both models show lasting dynamic equilibrium and resilience, resulting from negative feedback that
supports oscillating coexistence of diversity under a range of conditions. In the public health game, health
protection is followed by free-riding defectors, followed by a rise in infection, in long-lasting cycles. In the
microbial game, each of three strains takes turns dominating. In both games, the dynamic balance is tipped by
lowering the level of local clustering, changing the level of benefit, or lowering infectivity or attack rate.
Lowering infectivity has the surprising effect of increasing the numbers of infected individuals. We see parallel
results in the microbial game of three bacterial strains, where lowering one strain’s attack rate (analogous to
lowering infectivity) increases the numbers of the restrained attacker, a phenomenon captured by the phrase,
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Conclusions: Collective behavior often shows a dynamic balance, resulting from negative feedback, supporting
diversity and resisting change. Above certain threshold conditions, the dynamic balance is tipped towards
uniformity of behavior. Under a certain range of conditions we see “hydra effects” in which interventions to
lower attack rate or infectivity are self-defeating. Simple models of collective behavior can explain these
seemingly disparate dynamics.
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Background
Collective health behavior often demonstrates counter-
intuitive dynamics. Sometimes, collective behavior does
not respond to interventions designed to produce change.
At other times, collective health behavior may show ex-
treme responsiveness to a new small intervention or, more
generally, exhibits sudden large-scale change in response
to some small change in the environment, a phenomenon
often called reaching a “tipping point” [1–3] or “tipping
the balance.” In a population, this tipping can result in a
rapid spread of a behavior that defies standard predictions.
For example the change may not occur when expected, or
the direction of change may be in the direction opposite
to that expected. In fact, interventions in populations
sometimes have the opposite effect than predicted, a
phenomenon known as “policy resistance,” the “tendency
for interventions to be defeated by the system’s response
to the intervention” [4–6]. This counter-intuitive response
of a system is also known as the “hydra effect,” named
after a mythological multi-headed serpent that grew two
heads for every one that an individual cut off [7–9]. For
example lowering infectivity can result in increased total
infections. Interventions that lower risk can increase
adverse outcomes due to “risk compensation,” e.g. lower
perceived risk due to antiretroviral therapy (ART) can in-
crease sexual risk taking; [10] lower perceived risk may
lead to a premature drop in health protective measures;
[11] antibiotics resulting in increased infections due to
increased resistance [12], harm reduction can actually in-
crease negative consequences [13–15] In these cases, an
intervention to reduce infectivity (ART, antibiotic, harm
reduction) can have the opposite than expected effect.
These seemingly very different dynamics, I propose,
can all result from a single type of ecological resilience.
Public health behavior is part of a social ecological sys-
tem, because it involves interaction between individuals,
and this interaction affects mutually shared conditions.
Moreover, as we will see, health behavior can be subject
to negative feedback, also called “balancing feedback”
that tends to regulate behaviors at the population level.
Under these conditions of shared conditions and balan-
cing feedback, counter-intuitive dynamics often result,
such as stability when we would expect change, or
change when we would expect stability.
I will attempt to show that these various counter-
intuitive dynamics may stem from a model in which
health conditions are shared, and in which there is nega-
tive feedback in the form of health behavior that re-
sponds to disease. My aim is to provide a model that
provides one general explanation for a variety of effects
such as resilience, tipping and hydra effects. I present
and compare two related models of collective adaptation
and dynamic balance that can explain certain forms of
policy resistance resulting from a robust dynamic
equilibrium. I propose that these models also show how
“tipping” results when some initial state of dynamic bal-
ance is disrupted. Specifically, dynamic balance may
seem relatively invisible until some change, e.g. a minor
change in a network or in perceived benefit of a behav-
ior, upsets a dynamic balance. The models show how,
through collective adaptation, a population can retain a
diversity of behaviors that remain resilient against some
kinds of changes, whereas other kinds of changes will tip
the balance such that one behavior takes over.
For the above purposes, I offer a new repeated “public
health game” in which individuals choose to protect
health or not. In this model, benefits of health are shared
locally in a network. Health is a shared benefit when an
individual, by virtue of being healthy, confers benefit to
local contacts who transact with that person. Every indi-
vidual benefits from having healthy neighbors because
having healthy contacts allows the individual to engage
in beneficial transactions for work, recreation, financial,
physical and emotional support. There is abundant evi-
dence that having healthy alters (others) in one’s net-
work benefits ego. Higher amounts of social support is
associated with increased health in general [16–18].
Thus, we assume in our model that one’s healthy neigh-
bors are beneficial. More formally, an individual ego that
adopts health protective behavior gains health and also
benefits the ego’s nearest neighbors (alters). Each indi-
vidual ego earns benefit for each healthy person in their
local neighborhood (ego plus alters make up a local
neighborhood). Each individual can either protect their
health or not protect (defect). A “protector” essentially
puts up a shield to prevent spread of infection. Protec-
tors pay a cost in time, effort, or some other negative
consequence of taking protective action, but will be
healthy as result of taking the action. That is, protection
assures health as long as one protects but incurs some
immediate perceived cost, including time required to
perform the behavior, e.g. time to wash hands, discom-
fort or embarrassment in wearing a facemask, or using a
condom. “Defectors” pay no cost, because they are not
taking protective action, but they will become infected if
they have any infected neighbors.
This model I present applies to behaviors that protect
against spread of illness while that behavior is adopted,
e.g. facemasks prevent spread of respiratory illness
while used (by contrast vaccination lasts well past the
time of behavior). The public health model I present in
this paper thus applies to non-pharmaceutical protect-
ive behaviors such as facemask use, handwashing, or
condom use, all known to reduce transmission of infec-
tions [19], and applies to illnesses for which there is not
lasting immunity. Several transmissible diseases, often
caused by bacteria, do not produce an immune re-
sponse in the body, e.g., sexually transmitted such as
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gonorrhea, syphilis and chlamydia. For these bacterial
diseases, after antibiotic treatment is completed, indi-
viduals return to an unprotected, susceptible state.
Humans also are unlikely to develop full immunity to
some viruses, such as rotavirus and rhinoviruses that
cause acute respiratory infections and the common cold
[20]. There are more than 100 recognized serotypes of
Rhinovirus, the primary cause of common cold, and so
individuals are unlikely to develop full immunity [20].
Individuals can contract rhinovirus up to five to eight
times a year [21]. Recurrent protective behavior is ne-
cessary to prevent recurrent illnesses that spread.
Likewise the costs of protection associated with behav-
iors such as handwashing or facemask wearing are pro-
portional the period of the behavior, and recur with
repeat behaviors. Individuals perceive costs of using
facemasks to include discomfort, ill-fit, inconvenience
(when wanting to eat, speak or show facial expression
etc.), or embarrassment [19–24]. Perceived costs associ-
ated with handwashing include the time it takes, dis-
tance to water or skin irritation [25–30]. Perceived costs
associated with condoms include discomfort, violation of
perceived ethnic and religious norms against condoms,
perceived stigma of condom use, and anxiety discussing
condoms due to lack of trusting relationship with a part-
ner [31–37]. These costs and benefits recur when the
protective behavior recurs, and cease when the protect-
ive behavior ceases (true for handwashing, facemask
wearing and condom use). Several theories of health
behavior change, such as the health belief model and
transtheoretical (stages of change) model, posit that the
costs and benefits of health behaviors influence health
behavior, and these theories have been successfully
applied to handwashing, facemask wearing and condom
use [30, 38–41]. Likewise, individuals in the agent-based
public health model I present consider costs and benefits
of behaviors, but individuals learn the sum of costs and
benefits of behaviors by observing neighbors’ current
action and payoff. In my model, individuals only con-
sider the current situation, the current round of play.
Healthy defectors surrounded by only healthy individuals
experience the benefit of health but do not consider the
risk of infection, because they see no neighbors currently
infected. This roughly corresponds to the “pre-contem-
plation” stage of the stages of change model [38–43], in
which individuals do not consider the costs of the un-
healthy behavior. But defectors are likely to become
infected, at which point they experience the cost of de-
fection (loss of health), roughly corresponding to the
“contemplation” stage. Infected defectors next to one or
more health protectors may see that protection at this
point earns a higher payoff than defection. This corre-
sponds to the “determination” (or preparation) stage in
which an individual determines a behavior to adopt that
leads to a better outcome. Individuals who then adopt
protection are in the “action” stage. If a health protector
is surrounded by other health protectors, they gain posi-
tive social support (earning a benefit roughly propor-
tional to the number of healthy neighbors). So long as a
protector does not see defectors with higher payoffs, the
protector is not tempted to defect, and protection is
maintained, corresponding to the “maintenance” phase.
But a protector defects if they are next to a defector
earning the highest payoff, corresponding to “relapse”.
These examples, show how individuals might move
through stages of decision making based on costs and
benefits learned from neighbors in a network.
Each person can only interact with their neighbors in
a network (neighbors are those one step away, local
neighbors or “nearest neighbors”) [44]. Every individual
earns a total value (payoff ) that is the total benefit minus
the cost. Everyone then adopts the behavior of the local
neighborhood person with the highest current payoff. In
the real world, individuals may differ in what they sub-
jectively perceive as the highest payoff, but in this sim-
plified model the perceived success is equivalent to the
payoff we defined above which may represent perceived
health and happiness of individuals. Yet imitating the
person with the highest payoff is inherently subjective,
and is usually classified as a “bias.” Adopting the behav-
ior with the locally highest payoff, also called highest
payoff bias, “imitate the best,” [45] or copy-successful-
individuals [46, 47], is common among humans and ani-
mals [47–53] and is relatively adaptive to changing local
conditions despite that it biased [45, 46, 54, 55]. It likely
is very costly or not possible to monitor much more
than this local current sample and that it is likewise
costly to try to learn health behavior through trial and
error (perhaps getting sick along the way) [46, 56, 57],
therefore we have our simulated individuals adopt the
behavior with the locally highest payoff. If no local person
has a higher payoff than oneself, one does not change
behavior. All these steps in the game are repeated, allow-
ing the spread of behavior over time in the network.
Repeating this game model may reveal surprising re-
sults in the longer term. In the short run, it would seem
that clusters of healthy defectors benefit the most be-
cause they pay no cost and also have many healthy
neighbors. An individual can receive a benefit of healthy
neighbors without paying a cost, which is “defecting” or
free riding on protectors. However, the very success of
defection can be its undoing, due to spread of infection
to defectors. This is a negative feedback effect that leads
to a version of the classic tragedy of the commons [58].
Defection spreads widely at first, but then tends to slow
down or collapse entirely. The spread of defection trig-
gers a self-limiting negative feedback because defection
lowers its own source of benefit (healthy neighbors).
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The ensuing rise in infection should, in turn, lead to
more protection. This rise and fall of infection, defection
and protection could produce a dynamic balance result-
ing from the negative feedback of protection responding
to infection. This dynamic balance may result in resist-
ance to outside interventions because a rise in protec-
tion may be countered by a rise in defection and thus a
rise in infection. In fact, since defection can sometimes
be the victim of its own success, an intervention that
would seem to help defection and the spread of infec-
tion, may actually increase infections in the long run. To
see whether or not this is the case, we will run the pub-
lic health game repeatedly while varying the conditions
such as benefits, costs, infectivity, and network structure.
It will also be instructive to compare the results of the
public health game to a very simple case of dynamic bal-
ance that we can illustrate with a simple repeated game.
This game reveals how even seemingly lethally competi-
tive individuals, three strains of E. coli bacteria, can co-
exist, in a non-linear dynamic equilibrium [59, 60]. Thus
both models, the public health game and the microbial
rock-paper-scissors game, may show a similar resilience
resulting from negative feedback. Prior empirical re-
search has demonstrated that the rock-paper-scissors dy-
namics produce a kind of resilience, resulting from a
type of negative feedback process which, in turn, results
in counter-intuitive responses to lowered infectivity [61].
Such a counter-intuitive effect may also be present in
the public health game.
Methods
I simulated the above public health game in several
types of networks. Each simulation run begins by ran-
domly filling the network with 50 protectors and 50 %
defectors. In addition a random 10 % of individuals
have a contagious infection. Thus, the game starts with
a random distribution with 50 of individuals protecting,
50 defecting, and a random 10 % infected. Each healthy
individual gets a unit benefit b for being healthy and
confers a benefit to each local contact who is healthy
As a result, everyone gets a unit benefit b for each local
person (self and neighbors) who is healthy.
Why does one’s health benefit one’s neighbors? The
public health game assumes that physical health benefits
not only the healthy individual but also neighbors, by
allowing instrumental social support of those neighbors,
helping to perform functional activities or joining in rec-
reational activities. Conversely, a temporarily debilitating
disease, such as influenza or even a severe cold, limits
the instrumental support the ill person can offer to con-
tacts. Moreover viral infections are associated with de-
pression [62, 63], thus impairing emotional support an
infected person can offer. In contrast, positive mood
helps support others emotionally, for example a study
found each happy contact increases the probability per
year of becoming happy by 11 % [64]. Moreover, healthy
mood spreads through networks and healthy mood
among friends is associated with significantly reduced
risk of developing and increased chance of recovering
from depression [65]. Thus the benefits of health are
shared with one’s contacts, partly as instrumental and
emotional social support.
Protectors must pay a cost c for each neighbor. This is
an abstraction of the idea that in non-pharmaceutical
measures such as handwashing and facemask wearing,
the behaviors are roughly proportional to the number of
one’s contacts. Once one is away from all contacts, one
need not wear a facemask or wash hands. If an individ-
ual encounters contacts only during a brief visit to a gro-
cery store, one puts on a mask during that time, and
washes hands afterwards. However, if one comes in con-
tact with many others throughout most of the day, one
must wash hands or wear a mask throughout the day.
Somewhat similarly, one who has multiple sexual con-
tacts must more repeatedly use a condom.
A person who chooses to protect will not contract an
infection from a neighbor. If an infection is present in
an individual, it will spread to any neighbor who is not
protecting (defecting). We set the duration of infection
to 5. This is a simplified susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) model in which individuals are susceptible again
after an infection that lasts for 5 steps (game plays). Be-
cause there is a spreading disease, one can be healthy ei-
ther because they protect against the disease or because
the infection is not present locally.
At every round each individual adopts the local behav-
ior with the highest payoff, then recalculates their payoff.
Individuals change behavior only if one of the locals with
a different behavior than one’s self is earning more than
any other local (including one’s self ). We repeat this se-
quence. Running the game in with many repeated plays,
and with many variations of conditions, requires a com-
puter simulation. For this purpose I programmed the
game simulation in NetLogo [66, 67]. I simulated this
game in networks of size 61 by 61 (3721 individuals).
I repeated the public health game for each of a range
of ratios of b to c, always keeping c = 1, then increasing
b from 1 by .01 increments. I started with b = 1 then run
the simulation for 500 steps (game plays). Then I in-
creased b to 1.01, then simulated the game for 500 steps,
and so on for higher levels of b. I also varied the levels
of infectivity, holding the level of benefit and cost con-
stant. I set b/c to equal 5. Each person gains b = 5 for
every local person who is healthy, holding c equal to 1.
Then I varied infectivity from 100 % (infection will
always spread from an infected person to neighboring
defectors) down to 0 % (infection does not spread),
incrementing the likelihood of infection transmission by
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1 % at a time. For each of the resulting 101 levels of in-
fectivity, I simulated the game for 500 steps (game
plays), calculated the mean proportion infected, and
plotted the results. Having one distinct value for each
level of benefit, and each level of infectivity is a simple
way to revealing the bimodal results (as we will see in
the resulting plots of infectivity by proportion infected).
However it is also useful to have averages for each level
of infectivity. Therefore, for each of the 101 values of in-
fectivity (0–100 %), I ran 10 simulations of 500 steps
each and averaged the proportion of infected persons.
This produced 101 mean values of proportion infected
over 500 steps.
Clustered networks versus random networks
I compared the effects of type of population contact
structure by running simulations for different types of
networks, a random network and a square grid lattice
with varying levels of clustering. In each network type,
every individual has eight neighbors. The square grid
network naturally incorporates typical spatial clustering
of individuals and their conditions. In the square grid
lattice network, individuals can interact with their eight
nearest neighbors, much as checkers can interact with
their immediate neighbors on a board (north, south,
east, west, plus the four corners at the diagonals), and
the larger checkerboard grid structure results in a clus-
tering coefficient of 42.9 %. This means that for any in-
dividual in the grid, the proportion of one’s neighbors
that know each other is 42.9 %. This degree of clustering
of the networks we examine approximates that found in
many real social networks [68, 69] and has often been
found to be the underlying network structure in which
various health behaviors spread [70, 71]. I also ran simu-
lations for grid lattices with lowered levels of clustering.
To lower the clustering coefficient, I used an algorithm
[68] that randomly rewires a number x of the connec-
tions in the square grid lattice, while preserving an aver-
age K = 8. The rewiring process deletes a link in the
square lattice, and replaces it with a randomly selected
link. The algorithm iteratively finds reconnections until
x number of connections are rewired. However, the al-
gorithm does not change the total number of neighbors
each individual has. The outcome of this process is to
lower the clustering coefficient, the degree to which
each individual’s neighbors know each other, conferring
small-world properties to the network. Our analysis fo-
cuses on these networks with small-world properties.
Many social networks are structured as small-world
networks, in which the average path length between
pairs of individuals is relatively low, and yet the cluster-
ing remains relatively high, close to the level in a grid
lattice [68, 69].
In the random network, individuals are randomly con-
nected to each other, but to compare to the grid lattice
network we make sure that everyone only has an average
of eight neighbors as in the grid lattice. However, in the
random network, these links are generated by randomly
connecting everyone to eight other persons in the net-
work, on average. Thus, the random network is the same
as the grid-lattice in terms of average numbers of neigh-
bors, but in the random network one’s neighbors are
extremely unlikely to know each other (very low cluster-
ing). In other words, the random network, the average
proportion each individual’s neighbors who know one’s
other neighbors is nearly zero, whereas in the grid-
lattice network there is a high degree of neighbors
knowing each other (very high clustering). Health behav-
iors spread differently in a random versus a grid-lattice
network. For example, an experiment manipulating net-
work structure found that health behavior spread further
and faster through clustered-lattice networks compared
to random networks [70]. Thus, our comparison of a
random vs. a grid-lattice network is likely to show differ-
ent dynamics in the spread of behavior.
Microbial rock-paper-scissors simulation
The microbial simulation involves three strains of e-coli
on a surface containing nutrients. One strain produces
antibiotic which kills one other strain. A third strain is
resistant (“resister”). The strain that is vulnerable to the
antibiotic “producer” has its own strength, namely it can
grow rapidly (“grower”). Each strain can outcompete one
other strain, and in that sense are like a rock-paper-
scissors situation: Producer beats grower; Resister beats
producer; Grower beats resister. The winning strain re-
produces in the space occupied by the losing strain, so
as to consume the nutrients of the losing strain. But
what happens when all three strains are together in a
petri dish or on a stretch of tissue? Imagine each indi-
vidual microbial cell occupies one patch of a grid lattice
network. One can try this on a checkerboard by covering
each patch on the checkerboard with a chip of one of
three colors (red, green or purple). The chips of each
color are in equal numbers, each making up one-third of
the total, but they are distributed across the patches in
the grid at random. Each chip represents one of three
types of an e-coli bacterial cell surrounded by eight
other cells. Have each individual bacteria play the game
with all their eight local neighbors. Each individual re-
ceives 1 unit benefit b for every neighbor it beats. For
example, if the individual player is a Rock surrounded by
eight Scissors then the Rock wins eight points total in
payoff. After everybody gets their payoff, each individual
adopts the behavior of the highest scoring individual in
the neighborhood, including self and their eight neigh-
bors. This picking out of the locally highest payoff is the
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same general strategy we used in the public health game.
We can think of this as the bacterial strain spreading, or
a behavior spreading. In the case of the e-coli, the win-
ning local strain reproduces in the local spaces of the
losing strain.
In order to run this game for a variety of conditions, I
programmed the game in NetLogo software [66]. I ran
the rock-paper-scissors game in the same sized net-
works as for the public health game (3721 individuals).
As for the public health game, I compared a random
network to a grid lattice network (61 by 61 size grid),
and also varied the clustering levels in the grid by grad-
ually adding random structure to the grid network, re-
wiring local connections as described earlier. For each
value of non-local interaction, ranging from 0 to 5 %, I
plotted the final points after T = 500 rounds of play.
That is, I ran one simulation for 600 rounds of play
with 0 % non-local interactions. Then I ran another
simulation for T = 500 points with the proportion non-
local fixed at 0.1, and so on through 5 % non-local
interaction.
To determine the effect of decreasing the producer
strain’s attack rate, I ran the model 500 times for each of
levels of attack rate, ranging from 0 % (no attack, thus
no point gain when encountering grower) to 100 % (al-
ways attack when encountering grower, and always gain
a point for each encounter). I program recorded the
mean levels of each strain for each run of 500 steps.
Results and discussion
Thresholds and oscillations in the public health game
In the grid lattice network, protection cannot survive
when the benefit to cost ratio is below 4, and so infection
takes over (Fig. 1). Benefit to cost ratios larger than 4 in
the grid network allows protection to survive, but the
levels of protection, defection and infection oscillate, with
the average level of infection at about 25 %. That is, the
game produces oscillations of infection, protection and
defection, so long as the benefit is 4 or higher, when cost
is equal to 1. Decreasing the b/c to less than 4 is what tips
the balance towards the collapse of protection, and the
takeover of infection.
In a completely random network, the level of benefit
to cost ratio must be at least 5 for protection to survive.
Thus, compared to the grid lattice, the benefit must be
higher in the random network to support protection.
However, in the random network, protection often com-
pletely takes over, wiping out infection completely, when
the b/c is above 5 (Fig. 1). That is, in the random net-
work, when b/c is above five, protection either com-
pletely takes over and wipes out infection, or protection
dies, leaving infection at the highest levels.
In the intermediate networks with 30 % of connections
randomly rewired in a grid lattice, the b/c level must be
five or more for protection to survive, oscillating with
defection and infection, much like the grid lattice, but
the average levels of protection are slightly lower (Fig. 1).
Randomly rewiring 50 % of connections results in a
more random relationship with benefit, but the propor-
tion infected is relatively low for higher levels of benefit.
That is because a more randomly wired network is less
likely to support oscillations of protection, defection and
infection. In sum, the completely random network pro-
duces no oscillations, whereas the grid lattice network
does support these oscillations. Let us examine the na-
ture of these oscillations.
Fig. 1 Proportion infected by benefit of health and network type. For each level of benefit b shown, I ran one simulation run lasting 500 steps
(game plays) and calculated the averaged the proportion infected. The simulation runs all start with a random distribution of 50 protectors
and 50 % defectors, and 10 % of individuals infected. In the grid lattice network, when the health benefit is below 4, health protection and so
infection spreads unabated
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In the grid lattice network, when the benefit to cost
ratio is above 4, infection spreads among the defectors
in the early steps of the game, but by about 100 steps, a
substantial group of individuals learns to protect. A
smaller proportion learns to free-ride on the protectors,
defecting. Infection thrives on these defectors so a surge
of infection follows a rise in defection, and this is then
followed by protection. After an initial period of learn-
ing, the peaks consistently follow a pattern of protection,
defection, infection. To visualize why this cycle occurs,
examine the patterns of local spatial change in the
square grid (Fig. 2, compare left and right panels). We
see that when disease is not present locally, defection
rises. That is because some individuals who defect not
only can free-ride on healthy persons, but also are rela-
tively likely to be healthy themselves even while not pay-
ing the cost of protecting. It is an advantage in the short
run to defect in this situation so that the number of
healthy defectors rise, with these defectors bordering the
protectors. But soon this results in disease rising and we
see a sharp rise in infected defectors. That is because the
advantage of defecting is only temporary. At first defec-
tors are surrounded by enough healthy persons to have a
relatively high level of benefit, but often what happens is
defection spreads then disease takes over. As disease
spreads, protection again becomes an advantageous be-
havior. Thus protection rises. Put another way, there are
three kinds of negative feedback operating: (1) infection
lowers the level of healthy defectors when healthy defec-
tors rise high; (3) protection lowers infection after infec-
tion rises high; (3) defectors rise in response to the surge
in protectors.
As a result we see a cycle: a rise in protection, then a
rise in defection then a subsequent rise of infection.
Specifically, when disease drops, protection soon drops
in response. We then see a rise of healthy defectors,
followed by infected defectors (and a very few infected-
protectors who may still have not recovered from the
disease they contracted before they decided to protect).
We see this pattern spatially (Fig. 2) and temporally
(Fig. 3). Defectors always move in where there were
protectors, these defectors are generally healthy, and
can free ride upon the protection of the protectors.
Then infection spreads to the defectors (Fig. 2). A few
defectors decide to protect even before they have re-
covered from the disease. The overall result is a spatial
movement in the network in which the groups consist-
ently follow one another in the grid network: protec-
tion, then healthy defection, then infection. This type of
spread from neighborhoods to neighborhoods is pos-
sible in a network with high local clustering, where
there is thus much shared feedback about the local situ-
ation. This cycle, often lasting very long, is evident in
the overall population trends shown in Fig. 3.
Clustering, collective feedback, change at the margins
The extent to which a behavior can spread through a
network is a function not only of the behavioral rules of
the game, but also a function of the type of network.
The benefit of having healthy neighbors depends not
only upon the number of healthy neighbors but also de-
pends upon whether or not one’s healthy neighbors are
connected to each other. When many neighbors are
connected to each other, they are more likely to share
health conditions and information about those condi-
tions. When one’s neighbors protect health, those
neighbors are also helping each other. This leads to a
kind of spatial reciprocity of the same type that occurs
in a variety of cooperative games [72, 73]. Feedback to
any given individual comes from that individual’s local
neighbors, a local collective feedback, meaning that in-
dividuals can see the behaviors and the associated pay-
offs of local individuals.
Fig. 2 In a grid network, we start with a random distribution of 50 protectors and 50 % defectors, and 10 % of individuals infected,
infectivity = 100 %, b = 5, c = 1. The left panel shows an example of the spatial configuration of protection, defection and infection. This is
the pattern at time = 320 steps. The right panel shows the situation at five steps later, T = 325
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In the grid type of network, it is possible for behaviors
to cluster together. Imagine there are only 25 protectors
in the entire grid network. These protectors can form a
5 by 5 square block of protectors, such that the person
in the very center has eight protecting neighbors that
are themselves surrounded by 16 protectors. However,
in a random network with 25 persons protecting, it is
unlikely that a protector has protecting neighbors who
are in turn themselves surrounded by only protectors.
This is one way that protection can form as a collective
action in a grid network, but not in a random network.
While any individual benefits from taking protective
action, the shared benefits can be more concentrated in
a clustered network which makes it easier to spread.
Where a cluster of protectors meets a cluster of defec-
tors, defectors at the margins switch to protection (Fig. 2,
comparing the left panel to the right panel). As a result,
the collective of protectors expands. The positive ex-
ample of this cooperative protective action can spread in
a clustered network. Unfortunately, defection can thrive
where there are many protectors. For this reason, a clus-
ter of protectors can be replaced gradually with a cluster
of defectors. With enough defectors infection follows,
creating a cycle in a grid network, resulting from collect-
ive negative feedback.
Paradoxical effects of increasing infectivity
The situation described in the prior section also pro-
duces results that at first seem paradoxical. A decrease
in infection eventually produces a cycle of events that
lead to increase in infection, in a clustered network.
Likewise, were we to intervene by reducing infectivity
of the microbe, we can reduce individual’s perceived
need for protection. Running 500 runs of simulations
repeatedly for each varying infectivity from zero to
100 %, when b = 5, shows these surprising results
(Fig. 4). Increasing infectivity from zero to about 29 %
results in a higher average level of infection, but raising
infectivity higher and the infectivity begins to lower be-
cause protection kicks in to lower infection. The aver-
age benefit from health experienced by an individual is
a function of the number of local persons who are
healthy, which we can lower by either lowering benefit
or by lowering the chance of infection (infectivity).
When holding benefit constant, therefore, below a cer-
tain threshold level of infectivity, about 30 %, the bene-
fit of protection does not outweigh the costs. Above
this threshold, a kind of tipping point, higher infectivity
means that protection becomes more likely and this
reduces infection. This result is another case of nega-
tive feedback kicking in, once a certain level of infec-
tion occurs, protection is likely to reduce the infection.
When the benefit b is lower than the threshold neces-
sary for protection to take hold (b = 4 for a grid network
or b of about 5 for a random network), then the mean
proportion infected rises with increasing infectivity, as
would be expected (Fig. 4, for b = 3). However, when the
benefit is above the threshold needed for infectivity to
take hold (Fig. 4, for b = 5) then the slope of the relation-
ship between infectivity and proportion infected is hill
shaped (Fig. 4, which averages 10 simulation runs per
level of infectivity). The slope is positive for lower levels
of infectivity (below about 29) and then negative for
higher levels of infectivity (infectivity above about 29 %).
Moreover, the mean levels of proportion infected are bi-
modal. Above values of 30 % infectivity, each simulation
run produced one of two distinct values of mean propor-
tion infected, either about 80 % or a much lower level
that decreases linearly with level of infectivity (Fig. 5).
The bimodal results are easily seen when we plot one
mean level of infection per level of infectivity (as in
Fig. 5). The higher level of mean infected (about 80 %)
results when protection collapses early and so the infec-
tion takes over. The lower level occurs when protection
survives. When protection survives, it does so in linear
proportion to the degree of infectivity, with higher
Fig. 3 The public health game over 1000 steps. After an initial period of adaptation, three types consistently follow one after another: protection,
then healthy defection, then infection
Keane BMC Public Health  (2016) 16:265 Page 8 of 15
protection for higher infectivity. This occurs because the
payoff for protection versus the payoff for defection in-
creases with the chance of infection. This is true when b
is sufficiently high. Figures 4 and 5 shows the resulting
curves. When the benefit is set low, e.g. b = 3, then pro-
tection never takes hold so the proportion of infected is
simply a function of infectivity (Figs. 4 and 5).
Rock-paper-scissors game in microbial agent interaction
The public health game produced a pattern of cyclic os-
cillations (Fig. 3) that roughly follows what is known as
a rock-paper-scissors cycle, a cycle in which the fre-
quency of rock peaks, then the frequency of paper
peaks (because paper beats rock), then the frequency of
scissors peaks (because scissors beats paper) and this
Fig. 5 There is a bimodal level of average infection in the grid network when benefit is above the threshold allowing protection to survive. For
each level of infectivity, this plot shows one simulation run (whereas Fig. 4 averaged results over 10 simulation runs), which makes the bimodal
average infected evident when b = 5 in the grid network. The plots also show average proportion infected by infectivity for other network types.
In a grid lattice network, when infectivity is 29 % or higher, health protection was increasingly likely, and thus infection was increasingly lower.
There are two distinct average levels of infection, one for which protection survives, and another for which protection dies out early. In a random
network, rapid spread of disease early in simulation runs triggers protection which in turn lowers infection
Fig. 4 Hill-shaped relationship between average proportion infected and infectivity when benefit is above the minimum threshold allowing
protection to survive. This plot shows the average of 10 simulation runs for every level of infectivity. Each simulation lasted for 500 steps
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cycle repeats. At the local level we see collective clus-
ters of rocks gradually take over a collective cluster of
scissors and so on (Fig. 6), consistent with empirical
findings of the e-coli on a surface [59, 60]. At the global
level, each of the 3 strains will take a turn having a
higher proportion than the rest, but none will overtake
the others completely. Rather, each will average 33.3 %
of the total in the long run (Fig. 7). Each strain, each
with its own behavior, exists in local collective clusters,
which battle each other. However, at the global and
long-term level we see a balance, with each strain tak-
ing up an average of one third of the total population.
An important part of the explanation for the resilience
and cyclic dominance in the spatial rock-paper-scissors
game is the protective function of collectives. Collectives
in a grid can form a spatial shielding of community
members from exposure to outsiders. If we change that
grid structure by “rewiring” local connections, replacing
those with random connections, we can disrupt that
spatial protection and disrupt the cyclic dominance
(Fig. 7, right). We gradually rewire more and more con-
nections to determine the point that the cyclic domin-
ance is disrupted. After a certain number of rewirings,
between 3 and 4 %, the dynamic equilibrium tips over.
Above about 3–4 % of disruption of local clustering
(Fig. 7), we see the system tip to complete dominance of
one of the strains.
Paradoxical effects of lowering the attack rate
Another way to tip the balance is to lower the attack
rate of any strain. We will focus on the attack rate of the
producer. Recall that the producer wins over the grower
(because the grower is sensitive to the antibiotic made
by the producer). If there were only a pairwise competi-
tion between producer and grower, then lowering the
producer’s attack rate would only slow down the pro-
ducer’s rate of overtaking the grower. However, when
the three strains are operating, the effects are the
opposite. Dropping down the producers attack rate
below 20 % dramatically increases the numbers of pro-
ducers (Fig. 8). When the producer restrains its attack to
this very low level, then the susceptible strain grows very
quickly and wipes out the resistant strain. With the re-
sistant strain gone, the producer’s growth is unrestrained
(Additional file 1: Figure S2). This is because the pro-
ducer’s enemy is the resistant strain. The enemy of the
resistant strain is the susceptible strain (“grower”) which
is normally attacked by the producer of the antibiotic.
Increasing cost of antibiotic production
So far we have assumed that the costs of each strategy
in the rock-paper-scissors are all negligible (and so all
equal). There is a cost to producing the antibiotic, a cost
to growing more rapidly, a cost to resisting antibiotic.
When these costs are equal, then each of the three
strains averages at 33 %, following the usual rock-paper-
scissors dynamic. We can first set the costs of all three
strains to equal one, then vary the relative costs, e.g.
lower the costs of one of the strains, to see the effects.
What would happen if we lower the costs to producing
antibiotic? One naively may assume that this would in-
crease the success of the antibiotic producer. It turns
out that reducing the cost of the producer increases the
proportion of resisters to almost 40 %, on average, and
decreases the proportion of growers to about 28 %,
whereas the proportion of producers remains at about
33 %. This is true for cost reductions of 10 % down to
90 %. Reducing the cost by 100 % further increases the
proportion of resisters to about 45 and decreases
growers to about 22 %. If there were only two strains,
say producer and resister, this counter-intuitive result
would not hold. But when there are three strategies,
then giving a cost advantage to any of the strategies in
this rock-paper-scissors game, has the effect of increas-
ing the numbers of one’s enemy, due to there being
three negative feedback dynamics, which together form
Fig. 6 Left: Bacterial rock-paper-scissors at step 100 (left) and at step 101 (right)
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a new kind of negative feedback. So increasing the cost
advantage of the antibiotic producer actually increases
the number of resisters (Additional file 1: Figure S1).
Conclusions
The “public health game” demonstrated that when bene-
fits of health protection are shared locally in a network,
counter-intuitive dynamics result. First, this game pro-
duces a lasting dynamic equilibrium: health protection,
disease, and free-riding take turns predominating. The
public health game shows that, under a wide variety of
conditions, negative feedback in local neighborhoods
tends to result in toleration of coexistence of both pro-
tectors and defectors. Negative feedback in networks
with local clustering leads to nonlinear trends and often
coexistence of cooperative collective health protection
and free-riding in dynamic equilibrium. Likewise, in the
bacterial rock-paper-scissors, despite the fact that each
strain kills another strain, all three strains co-exist in
cyclic dominance of tolerance and constant adaptation.
A variety of behaviors among humans and animals also
follow this rock-papers-scissors patterns or similar forms
of a cyclic dominance, which can involve three or even
more than three behaviors [74–76]. A relatively simple
case of this population rock-paper-scissors dynamic oc-
curs when microbes compete for resources, inspiring the
microbial model simulations we examined, which corre-
sponds to a dynamic seen in real e-coli, when the three
strains interact on a surface of nutrients. Pairwise in
vitro competitions between each of the three e-coli
strains shows each of the three rock-paper-scissors rules
to be empirically true [60]. The researchers took only
two strains at a time in laboratory experiments, and con-
firmed these simple rules. If we only put resister and
producer together, resister is happy to reduce producer
down to zero. Now the question is what happens when
all three strains are together. One might expect that the
antibiotic producer would kill the fast growing but sensi-
tive bacteria, but it turns out that the three strains can
coexist in dynamic equilibrium in our model and in the
empirical petri dish tests [59, 61], a pattern in which
each strain predominates for a brief while, but none
completely overtakes the test. The three negative feed-
back loops together form a new kind of negative that
balances all three over time. The result is cyclic domin-
ance, with each strain taking turn dominating but none
Fig. 8 Lowering producer’s rate of attacking grower increases the producer’s abundance, and decreases the abundance of the grower strain
Fig. 7 Left: Cyclic dominance over the first 50 steps (in a grid with no rewirings). Right: Long-term results for rock-paper-scissors game plotted
against the proportion of local connections rewired. These are the average proportions after 500 steps
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taking over completely [59, 61]. This is a type of resili-
ence, meaning the system returns to a balance after a de-
viation [77].
Crucially, the cyclic dominance we saw in the rock-
paper-scissors game depends upon local collective
interaction, upon bacteria interacting only with local
neighbors, and then those neighbors interacting with
their local neighbors. Bacteria on a surface of a petri-
dish or a gut have local neighbors in a network, some-
what like the grid network we have examined. Re-
searchers have tried shaking the flask of bacteria to
break up the local effects, similar to randomly rewiring
local links. That disrupts the balance, prevents the es-
tablishment of biodiversity; eventually one strain takes
over [59, 78].
Both games show adaptive local community resilience,
but also show “policy resistance” in which interventions
can be self-defeating. A more colorful metaphor for this
effect, often used in ecology [8] and sometimes in polit-
ical science [9], is the “hydra effect,” where cutting of
any of the several heads of the monstrous hydra results
in more heads appearing than even before. Such a var-
iety of effects, growth and change when we expect sta-
bility, and stability when we expect change, can result
from a single form of balance resulting from negative
feedback in both of the games. This balance, resulting
from negative feedback (also known as balancing feed-
back), can be tipped by disrupting local community
structure or by changing the level of infectivity, analo-
gous to an attack rate. In both cases the results of the
tipping can be counter-intuitive. Due to negative feed-
back, lowering infectivity below a certain threshold (tip-
ping point) can increase the total infection. The most
dramatic effect is seen when dropping infectivity from a
number close to 100 % to about 30 % or below. Likewise,
in the case of the e-coli strains, lowering an antibiotic
producer’s attack rate, the number of sensitive strains it
kills per contact actually increases the producer’s num-
bers. Dropping down the producer’s attack rate below
20 % dramatically increases the numbers of producers.
Much as we saw in the simulation (Fig. 8), researchers
found empirical evidence that producers of antibiotic
that restrain their attack (a mutation of producers that
has a lower attack rate) actually increase in abundance, a
phenomenon in cyclic dominance known as “survival of
the weakest” [61, 79]. In both the public health game
and the microbial game, this “survival of the weakest” ef-
fect results from a multiple types of negative feedback
captured by the phrase, “the enemy of my enemy is my
friend” an ancient adage still in use in political rhetoric
because it seems to describe actual patterns of strategic
conflict [80].
The antibiotic producer’s enemy is the resistant strain.
The enemy of the resistant strain is the susceptible strain
(“grower”) which is normally attacked by the producer
of the antibiotic. So if the producer instead restrains its
attack to a very low level, then the susceptible strain
grows very quickly and wipes out the resistant strain.
Now the producer’s growth is unrestrained. Likewise in
the public health game, the enemy of infection is health
protection, because protection curbs local infection in
the short run. However, an enemy of protection is
healthy defectors, because healthy defectors can do very
well, in the short run, thus “persuading” protectors to
defect. Then defectors become the victim of their own
success, much as we saw in the very simple example in
Fig. 1, in which the more successful defector persuaded
others to defect. Lowering infectivity can help defectors
do well by making it possible to defect and yet be
healthy. As a result, defection rises, increasing vulner-
ability to infection. Thus reducing risk of infection by
reducing infectivity can lead to a compensation, if indi-
viduals compensate for lower infectivity by switching
from protection to defection.
A somewhat similar effect seems to operating in “risk
compensation,” in which individuals who perceive
lower risk in turn lower their protective behavior [81].
Individuals may learn that using anti-retroviral therapy
(ART) lowers infectivity [10, 82–84]. However, believ-
ing that infectivity is lowered by the ART apparently
leads many to decrease health protective behavior such
as using a condom or limiting the number of one’s part-
ners [10, 82, 83, 85, 86]. One component of this feed-
back loop is risk compensation, an increase in unsafe
behaviors in response to perceptions of decreased risk
caused by introduction of preventive or treatment
interventions (“harm reduction” interventions) [81], e.g.
seatbelt wearing increasing reckless driving [87], use of
sunscreen increasing sun exposure [88], as well as ART
increasing unprotected sex. These cases of risk com-
pensation are a type of policy resistance that we can
better understand with systems modeling that include
feedback [4–6, 89–91]. Fearing that harm reduction can
lead to increase risk taking, healthcare providers, policy
makers or citizens may oppose such approaches. For
example, Healthcare providers sometimes resist wide
distribution of drugs such as Naloxone that reduce
drug overdose deaths because it might be perceived as
a “safety net” encouraging for risker drug use [92]. Al-
though my model did not attempt to model this variety
of health behaviors, the results suggest the need to cre-
ate dynamic models for a variety of these other behav-
iors to see if similar results apply. In any case, it seems
that the rational policy response is to provide incentives
to increase protective behavior in addition to any treat-
ments that reduce harm. However, some worry that pre-
ventive or curative treatments to infection will undermine
behavioral restraint that normally result from fear of a rise
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in infection [83]. The most pernicious form of this belief
is that infection is punishment for what they see as be-
havioral transgression [93, 94]. From such an intolerant
standpoint, the negative feedback loop between disease
and abstinent behavior is desirable, and a cure would
negate that loop. Thus, research that identifies individ-
uals’ perceptions of feedback loops, including perceived
benefits, costs and risks, may uncover morally charged
values. Making explicit assumptions, values and per-
ceived causal feedback loops, through a combination of
qualitative methods and system modeling [95] seems an
effective approach for engaging groups of stakeholders
and establishing common understandings in economic
and ecological development [96, 97], and may prove ef-
fective in advancing a participative-collaborative under-
standing of resilience in social-ecological systems [98].
Such a discussion begins by making assumptions explicit.
The assumptions of the models I presented are highly
simplified in that we assume everyone follows the same
simple rules given the situation they face. This simplifi-
cation allowed us to conclude that complex patterns of
resilience, cyclic dominance and hydra effects can
emerge even with these simple assumptions, e.g. we do
not need very complex rules and individual differences
to yield complex results. When individuals take action,
this affects the situation of others, thus we could thor-
oughly explore a dynamic missed in more static behav-
ioral models. However, the simplicity of the dynamic
rules in the models I presented is also a limitation, and
future work should address variants of the models. We
systematically explored how results change when we
vary perceived benefit, vary infectivity and attack rate,
and vary network structure. To some extent, we can
infer that the results for low infectivity or zero infectiv-
ity resemble what happens when individuals can be-
come immune. We saw that hydra effects occur for
infectivity near zero, possibly suggesting that hydra ef-
fects may occur when individuals acquire immunity as
well. However, we did not explore vaccination behavior.
Future work should systematically examine what hap-
pens when individuals acquire immunity through vac-
cination, e.g. do we still see the types of resilience and
resistance? As a starting point, this paper has demon-
strated some ways that resilience and resistance are
forms of balance that can be tipped by disrupting local
community feedback, either by breaking up local links
directly or by altering the benefits, costs and risks. This
modeling perspective, along with participative discus-
sion, may lead to more effective, if counter-intuitive
approaches to interventions, e.g. ways of tipping the
status quo equilibrium, or countering hydra effects.
Methodologically, agent-modeling combined with lon-
gitudinal data and, if possible, social network data on
perceived costs, benefits and behaviors, should help
researchers should researchers spot the types of non-
linear effects identified in this paper. Standard assump-
tions of linear effects of interventions can interfere
with finding non-linear effects, such as tipping points,
policy resistance and hydra effects.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Figure S1. Lowering the costs for producing antibiotic
has the effect of increasing resistance. At first this effect seems surprising,
but what is happening is that by giving a cost advantage to the producer,
the grower, the enemy of the producer decreases. Also the producer’s
predator, the resister, increases in abundance because its own predator
has decreased. Figure S2. When producer’s (purple) attack rate is set at
a very low level (10 % here), the producer allows its prey (grower, shown in
green) to multiply, leading to extinction of resister (red), allowing the
producer to take over. In this example of run with the producer attack rate
set at 10 %, the producer takes over by 28 steps. (DOCX 106 kb)
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